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Abstract
We consider the joint eﬀect of profit and Pigouvian taxation in a model of
imperfect competition. We show that, when both profit taxation and Pigou-
vian taxation/subsidy are used, the former is no longer neutral. The two
fiscal tools are substitutes, and for any profit taxation rate there exists a
unique Pigouvian tax that entails the first best outcome as an equilibrium.
Our analysis therefore suggests that policy makers in charge of diﬀerent tax-
ation policies should coordinate in order to optimally design the tax menu
for firms.
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1 Introduction
There exists a relatively large literature on profit taxation in static models of
imperfect competition (Levin, 1985; Besley, 1989; Delipalla and Keen, 1992;
Dung, 1993; Denicolo` and Matteuzzi, 2000; Ushio, 2000, inter alia). A well
established result of this literature is that the taxation of operative profits
(defined as the profits gross of fixed costs) is neutral, in that it does not aﬀect
first order conditions on market variables.
A parallel stream of research focuses on the eﬀectiveness of a Pigouvian
taxation/subsidy in inducing the firms to internalise the externalities in-
volved in the production process (Benchekroun and Long, 1998, 2002; Karp
and Livernois, 1994; Damania, 1996, inter alia). The eﬀect of this form of
taxation/subsidy is to distort the incentives for the firm in order to make
the choice of its market variable consistent with the outcome that maximises
social welfare.
In this paper we consider the joint eﬀect of profit and Pigouvian taxa-
tion in a model of imperfect competition. We show that, when both profit
taxation and Pigouvian taxation/subsidy are used, the former is no longer
neutral. The two fiscal tools behave as substitutes, and for any profit tax rate
there exists a unique Pigouvian tax rate that entails the first best outcome
as an equilibrium. This prompts for a coordination eﬀort among the policy
makers in charge of designing optimally the diﬀerent tax rates to which firms
are subject in industries featuring environmental externalities.
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2 Profit taxation is not neutral
Consider a market with demand function p = p(Q), with p(Q) decreasing
and non-convex in Q, where Q is aggregate output. Production costs for
each firm i = 1, 2, ...n are given by Ci = C(qi) + f, with ∂C(qi)/∂qi > 0
and the fixed cost f > 0. The latter is taken to be small enough to ensure
that individual profits be non-negative at the Cournot equilibrium with n
firms. Supplying the final good to the market entails a negative externality
S = S(Q), where Q =
Pn
i=1 qi, with ∂S(Q)/∂Q > 0 and ∂S(Q)/∂qi > 0 for
all i = 1, 2, ...n.1 Let θ ≥ 0 be a tax rate to be paid by each firm as a function
of the externality and let t ∈ [0, 1) be the tax rate on operative profits. This
implies that the firm’s profit is
πi(Q) = [p(Q)qi − C(qi)] (1− t)− f − θS(Q) ≥ 0. (1)
If firms compete a` la Cournot-Nash, the first order condition for each firm i
is
∂πi
∂qi
=
∙
∂p(Q)
∂qi
qi + p(Q)−
∂C(qi)
∂qi
¸
(1− t)− θ∂S(Q)
∂qi
= 0 (2)
which identifies a maximum iﬀ
∂2p(Q)
∂q2i
<
θ∂2S(Q)/∂q2i
(1− t) qi
+
1
qi
∙
∂2C(qi)
∂q2i
− 2∂p(Q)
∂qi
¸
. (3)
Clearly, when θ = 0, the choice of the tax rate on profit is irrelevant and
the optimal level of individual output is the solution of the expression in the
square bracket2. Nevertheless, this conclusion no longer holds if θ is positive.
1A similar reasoning holds when the externality is positive, provided the signs are
changed to take into account the introduction of a Pigouvian subsidy.
2The case where ∂S(Q)∂qi = 0 is not interesting, as this implies that the firm has no
influence on the externality.
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Lemma 1 Provided firms are subject to any Pigouvian tax rate θ > 0, then
profit taxation is non-neutral.
Define as q∗i (t, θ) the solution to (2). Then, using the implicit function
theorem, one can examine the eﬀect of the taxation menu on the optimal
output of each individual firm, as well as the interplay between the two
forms of taxation, to prove:
Proposition 2 In correspondence of the optimal output decision of the generic
firm i, Pigouvian taxation and profit taxation are strategic substitutes.
Proof. It suﬃces to observe that
dθ
dt
= − ∂
2πi
∂qi∂t
/
∂2πi
∂qi∂θ
= −qi · ∂p(Q)/∂qi + p(Q)− ∂C(qi)/∂qi
∂S(Q)/∂qi
< 0 (4)
because the numerator is necessarily positive from (2). Hence the tax menu
available to the policy maker(s) is characterised by a negative marginal rate
of substitution between the two forms of taxation.
3 Example
Consider an oligopolistic market where n symmetric firms produce a homo-
geneous good. The market demand function is p = a−Q where Q ≡
Pn
i=1 qi
and qi is firm i’s outputi, i = 1, 2, ...n. Technology is the same for all firms and
it is summarised by the cost function C(qi) = cqi − f, where c ≥ 0. This en-
tails that firm i’s net profits in absence of any taxation are πi = (p− c) qi−f.
Supplying the final good entails a negative environmental externality S =PN
i=1 bqi, with b ≥ 0, that negatively aﬀects consumers’ utility. The social
planner chooses the Pigouvian tax rate θ ≥ 0 that each firm has to pay as
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a function of the amount of the environmental externality produced by the
industry. Moreover, operative profits are taxed at the rate t ∈ [0, 1], so that
the net after-tax profits of firm i are
πi = (p− c) qi(1− t)− f − θS. (5)
The present game has a two-stage structure: in the first stage, the social
planner chooses the taxation rate on profits t and the taxation rate on the
negative externality θ produced by the industry in order to maximise social
welfare
SW = nπi + CS. (6)
Total tax revenues, T = n [(p− c) qit+ θS] are transferred to consumers,
whose surplus reads as
CS =
Q2
2
− S + T. (7)
In the second stage, firms compete a` la Cournot-Nash.
4 Equilibrium analysis
The solution concept is subgame perfection by backward induction. This
requires determining the optimal output produced by each firm as a function
of the taxes chosen by the social planner as the leader in the first stage. From
the first order condition at the second stage, one obtains:
q∗i (t, θ) =
1
1 + n
µ
a− c− bθ
1− t
¶
(8)
for every i = 1, 2, ...n. As ∂qi(t, θ)/∂t < 0 for all θ > 0 and ∂qi(t, θ)/∂θ < 0
for all t ∈ [0, 1) , we can state the following:
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Lemma 3 For θ > 0, the individual output level decreases (increases) if
the taxation rate on operative profits and on the environmental externality
increases (decreases).
Note also that, if the social planner does not tax the environmental ex-
ternality, then the tax rate on variable profits does not aﬀect the optimal
individual output.
Substituting (8) in (5) yields the following expressions for the net indi-
vidual profits, the amount of externality and total revenues:
π∗i =
(1− t) [(a− c)2(1− t)− f(1 + n)2]− bθ [(a− c)(1 + n2)(1− t) + bn2θ]
(1 + n)2(1− t)
(9)
S∗ =
nb
1 + n
µ
a− c− bθ
1− t
¶
(10)
T ∗ =
n [bθ − (a− c)(1− t)] [bnθ(1− n(1− t))− (a− c)(1− t)t]
(1 + n)2(1− t)2 . (11)
Plugging the above expressions in (6) one obtains:
SW ∗ = −fn+ (12)
n
2(1 + n)2(1− t)2 [2bc(1 + n) + (a
2 + c2 − 2fn)(2 + n) +
−2a(b+ 2c+ bn+ cn)(1− t)2 +
+2b(a− b− c− cn)(1− t)θ − b2nθ2 − 2f ].
Now, solving ∂SW ∗/∂θ = 0, one has
θ∗ =
(1− t) [b (n+ 1)− a+ c]
b
> 0 (13)
for all b > (a− c) / (n+ 1) , where the lower bound to b coincides with the
optimal Cournot-Nash output in absence of Pigouvian taxation, qCN (θ = 0).
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From (13), we draw an immediate implication concerning the elasticity of
substitution:
|εθt| = −∂θ
∗
∂t
· t
θ∗
=
t
1− t ∈ [0, 1) ∀ t ∈ [0, 1/2) . (14)
This entails that, if diﬀerent authorities manoeuvre the two tax rates, they
should coordinate in order to achive the welfare maximisation that, in prin-
ciple, is their common objective. In practice, the alternative between taxing
and subsidising firms in order to regulate the amount of pollution depends
on parameter b. This amounts to saying that the agency in charge of the
environmental policy should inform the fiscal authority about the marginal
environmental impact of the technology employed by firms operating in the
industry under examination.
Given the optimal Pigouvian policy being adopted, the equilibrium out-
put for the individual firm is
q∗i (θ
∗) =
a− c− b
n
> 0∀ b ∈ [0, a− c) , (15)
with q∗i (θ
∗) < qCN (θ = 0) for all b > (a− c) / (n+ 1) , entailing that, when-
ever firms are subject to a positive Pigouvian tax rate aimed at reducing
the environmental externality, they restrict production as compared to the
Cournot-Nash benchmark where Pigouvian taxation is absent.
The intuitive interpretation of the above result is that, if polluting emis-
sions are very relevant, then the external eﬀect dominates the price eﬀect,
and therefore the planner wants firms to reduce output although this involves
a price increase. Exactly the opposite holds if the balance between the two
eﬀects speaks in favour of the price eﬀect, whereby if b < (a− c) / (n+ 1) ,
then θ∗ indeed becomes a subsidy to firms notwithstanding the presence of
the externality.
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The resulting social welfare level is SW (θ∗) =
£
(a− c− b)2 − 2nf
¤
/2,
which coincides with the first best level that the planner would attain by
choosing directly the aggregate industry output instead of taxing polluting
emissions of the n Cournot oligopolists (to this regard, see Benchekroun and
Long, 1998).
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